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Abstract: With the continuous evolution of distributed computing grids and with the
perpetuous development of the available computing resources and protocols, there is a sine
qua non requirement to pass beyond the physical design of the grids. A viable solution is
offered by virtual grids, having the advantage of flexible mapping and adaptation to live
in-place resources. A software image is proposed, built with the use of the Globus Toolkit,
the herein document describing the construction and configuratin phases as well as the
deployment protocol in a live grid - Grid5000.
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perpetuous development of the available computing resources and protocols, there is a sine
qua non requirement to pass beyond the physical design of the grids. A viable solution is
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in-place resources. A software image is proposed, built with the use of the Globus Toolkit,
the herein document describing the construction and configuratin phases as well as the
deployment protocol in a live grid - Grid5000.
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1 Introduction
With the continuous development of highly reconfigurable grids and with the continously ex-
pansion of interconnected computing resources, virtualization and generalization over phys-
ical boundaries represents a conditio sine qua non. As constant change represents an im-
mutable characteristic of nowadays grids, the design of a distributed computing system has
to envision for scalability beyond the initial specifications. In the herein document we present
the basic concepts of virtual grids, describing the steps to be followed for constructing and
deploying software operating system images in live physical grids.
The core of the exposed virtual grid design is modeled by employing the Globus Toolkit1
which is the current de facto standard for virtual grids development. In addition, the
proposed design had as first target and as a test case exemplification, the deployment and
execution of MPICH-G22/Globus based applications. The proposed software image offers
out of the shelf the ground base for the development of Globus and MPICH-G2 based
applications. As case study we considered a live nation-wide distributed computing system
- Grid50003.
As it will be later exposed in the following sections, Grid5000 is a highly reconfigurable
grid with a large spectrum of methodologies and applications. The development and the
evolution of Grid5000 stands as a combination of design patterns set in place (a) to overcome
the limitations observed in simulators, emulators and real platforms and (b) as a result of
the Grid community research topics investigations [1]. Furthermore, Grid5000 comes to
meet user-centered specific requirements - setting up a virtual grid allows for the creation
of a completely customized environment.
Extending the certainity of future multiple interconnected grids to the present, the ad-
vantage of having an on demand deployable environment represents the key for adaptibility
and flexibility. Supposing a scenario under which it is required to connect Grid5000 with
several different grids, even simultaneously, virtualization stands as an efficient and rapid
solution.
While addressing a real specific case study, the exposed design elements and application
target scalability issues, having in mind the imminent expansion towards multiple different
interconnected grids. Surmounting physical limitations allows for the extension of available
features, at the cost of constructing the underlying infrastructure. As this step, defining
the basis for further development, represents a complex task to accomplish, a ready to use
minimalistic environment is proposed in this document. The goal of the constructed envi-
ronment is to offer the means for facilitating the mapping of virtual distributed computing
systems over live ones. For further more complete details on the presented concepts and
technical aspects refer to the Globus dedicated website (http://www.globus.org) as well as
to the following documents: [2], [3], [4], [5], [6].
The following sections present the main steps to be considered when building a Globus
virtual Grid. In Section 2 the main Globus related concepts are presented along with a
1http://www.globus.org
2http://www3.niu.edu/mpi/
3https://www.grid5000.fr
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short introduction to grid infrastructure considerations from an architectural and security
point of view. In addition, several Globus components are discussed - only the minimum
detail has been considered, focusing only on the main required components. Section 3
offers a closer view on the technical elements required for setting up and interconnecting
the presented components, starting from scratch. All the necessary steps are presented,
starting from environment configuration, required packages, installation, compilation, etc.
Security aspects are also considered, offering a brief example for generating and installing
digital certificates. Section 4.1 includes a short description of the considered case study -
Grid5000. A brief discussion is made on user policies, logical and physical environment,
reconfigurability aspects, deployment, etc. The Globus deployment protocol is discussed in
Section 4.2 - the deployment procedure is presented in a step-by-step manner. The final part
of the section also presents deployment tests on five Grid5000 clusters as well as a broadcast
messaging test with a number of processes of up to 300. In the end a few short conlusions
are presented in Section 5, including references to future Grid5000 collaboration projects.
2 Globus Toolkit
The Globus Toolkit represents the outcome of an effort to construct the underlying support
for service oriented distributed applications. As illustrated in Figure 2, the architecture
of the Globus Toolkit includes several different levels, elementary entities for distributed
systems being implementing as software components. Consecrated standards were adopted
to stand as a base for designing security enhanced components, dealing with authentication,
authorization and access control, encryption and data integrity - the main axes of the Grid
Security Infrastructure (GSI).
The Globus Toolkit is constructed around the concept of interoperability having as back-
bone Web Services, authorization and security standards - Web Services Interoperability,
SAML, XACML, SSL, X.509 digital certificates, etc. A schematic overview comprising the
Globus Toolkit components is prestented bellow. In addition, cross-component tools may be
considered, reunited under a development kit known as the Commodity Grid (CoG) which
offers high-level framework support for Java and Python, for GT2 and GT4.
2.1 Grid Architecture and Security
As main aspects to be addressed when constructing a blueprint of a grid, computational and
data storage requirements and constraints have to be considered. These initial specifications
are further subject to the continuous evolution of the grid technologies, thus requiring high
fault tolerance and adaptability capabilities. Another characteristic to be included as ini-
tial design factor is the envisaged collaboration, interoperability and inter-communication
pattern to be supported.
Under the above considerations, grids can be classified as (a) computational grids and
(b) data storage grids, employing a high demand in the form of computational-intensive
applications or in data storage and management, respectively. Further differentiation may
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Figure 1: The Globus Toolkit components - Pre-WS and Web Services based components.
be implied by considering the chosen distribution model, distinguishing High Performance
Computing as opposed to High Throughput Computing.
Computational grids allow for a high processing output obtained as the cumulative power
of multiple low-level ordinary systems, heterogeneous collections of computational systems
being rendered as a unified aggregate. As extensive processing power is demanded, closely
coupled computing units may be unified under a cluster interface or as a cluster of clusters.
At the opposite extreme loosely coupled systems can be considered, composed of domain-
independent distributed volatile resources. In this scenario, each of the computational units
represents an infinitesimal part of a distributed pattern disrupting data semantics awareness
at the level of the processing nodes.
Data storage and management grids require secure and reliable manipulation of data
over a distributed environment, acting when required as back-ends for computational grids.
Performance measures relate in this case to data filtering, metadata based access, data
retrieval and data relocation operations. Considering the semantics associated with the pro-
cessing flow, different concepts may be introduced, i.e. multiple/unified query points, data
consistency, resource monitoring and load balancing, etc. In this case the data stream may
incur staging, translation and repartition over heterogeneous pools of data under federated
database management.
As examples we may cite the case of Distributed Terascale Facility (TeraGrid), DOE
Science Grid, NASA Information Power Grid (IPG), Earth System Grid (ESG), GRID5000,
DAS-2, etc.
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Securing a grid expanding over a large collection of heterogeneous resources, including
different administrative domains, requires the authentication of the users and services as
well as data transfer encryption mechanisms. Inside a virtual grid deployed via the Globus
Toolkit authentication is performed by employing X.509 digital certificates delivered and
signed by a Certification Authority (CA). A digital certificate encloses a digital signature,
i.e. a public key, and descriptive elements linking the certificate to the identity of the owner
- user(s), service(s), resource(s), etc. All the included descriptive attributes constitute as a
unique distinguished name, specifying, for example, the name of the user and its coordinates
inside the grid, for user certificates, or a Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) for server
certificates.
The digital certificate ports as warrant from the CA’s part for the owner as being part
of the grid environment or domain. Furthermore, the certificate has to guarantee for facile
fraud and integrity detection, while uniquely identifying the designated entity or the domain
of resources, e.g. there should be no confusion between the identities of distinct components
of the grid. Covering a large domain of concepts and enclosing several security notions, the
following terms may be considered as introductory basis:
 authentication - the valid identification of a resource according to the afferent cer-
tificate which, in this case, stands for its identity inside the distributed environment
context. For each action or request, pertinent inside the boundaries of a limited desig-
nated domain, authentication has to be achieved first before actually performing the
specified task. Authentication may be also demanded in the case of delegated actions
for remotely impersonated software components.
 authorization - while authentication validates the identity of a user, access limitations
may be imposed defining a boundary enclosing the actions the requesting entity is
acknowledged as having the right to perform.
 encryption and data integrity - as authentication and authorization control rep-
resent local security enforcement measures, no control is exerted over inter-domain
communication, hence data encryption is required. Furthermore, data integrity mech-
anisms have to assure for no incidental data alteration during information exchange.
In addition, encryption and data integrity mechanisms assure the confidentiality of
sensitive information.
Already included in the Globus Toolkit, a Simple Certification Authority may be used
for signing and delivering certificates - to no extent replacing a fully qualified CA, as it
is designated for testing purposes only. The afferent certificate management tasks are ac-
complished as part of the Grid Security Infrastructure in conjunction with a Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI). Enabling the CA requires as a first step the generation of a pair of
private and public keys, the private key being used for signing the CA’s certificate. The
private key is further used for signing each of the requested and delivered certificates inside
the designated domain hence representing one of the main security points. A digital cer-
tificate assigned to a specific entity represents the key it employs for SSL encryption when
INRIA
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transferring data, impersonating the owner specified by the certificate. While relying on the
fulfillment of several constraints, cross certification may also be attained by assuring mutual
recognition between distinct Certification Authorities.
An additional requirement for constructing a virtual Globus grid is having synchronized
all the involved machines. As time stamps are used as marker for each delivered certificate,
an action is considered valid and hence authorized only for its associated time span. As
a consequence, a network time protocol (NTP) has to be configured requiring the use of a
time synchronization server.
While to a given extent security enforcement may prove to be sufficient and self-sustained,
vulnerabilities may persist due to several causes ranging from configuration issues to inap-
propriate environment operation and manipulation. Unauthorized access to grid resources
may result as a consequence of interference with parts of the network not concerned by the
virtual grid, impersonation attacks, compromised security points, etc.
For our specific case, GRID5000, different security levels may be considered, the con-
structed virtual grid being placed on top of the already in place security layer. Furthermore,
given the reconfigurable nature of the environment, the virtual grid represents a volatile en-
vironment lasting only for the duration of a grid reservation. Further details concerning
GRID5000 as well as the superposition of the two grids, the physical in place one and the
virtual grid, will be presented in the following sections.
2.2 Globus Toolkit Components
In the followings, a few main components of the Globus Toolkit are briefly presented in
order to offer a general perspective over the interacting parts of the framework as well as
their role in constructing a distributed grid environment and in deploying a distributed grid
application.
Globus Security Infrastructure (GSI) - designed around the Secure Socket Layer
(SSL) protocol with the support of Generic Security Service API. The SSL protocol, alter-
natively known as the Transport Layer Security (TLS), represents a standard promoted by
the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). The core security concepts of GSI employ as
key element X.509 encoded digital certificates, also a standard sustained by the IETF. As
out of scope for the current paper, no further details were considered for the mentioned ele-
ments - the target functionalities offered by the GSI include mutual authentication, secured
communications, delegation and single sign-on.
Monitoring and Discovery Service (MDS) - decentralized monitoring service of-
fering the support for collecting static as well as dynamic information, describing the dis-
tributed environment. It is mainly based on the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
(LDAP), the Grid Index Information Service (GIIS) and the Resource Information Service
(GRIS), services which we will not discuss as being out of scope. While not active as part
of the grid image architecture delivered on GRID5000, it represents an important module
to be considered for further development.
Dynamically-Updated Request Online Coallocator (DUROC) - coordinates the
resource manager transactions in order to guarantee the necessary resources for executing
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distributed jobs. The DUROC module acts as a coallocator, the resource managers layering
the interaction with job managers. As main interest we may point the possibility of syn-
chronizing multiple jobs by imposing a startup barrier as well as the support for inter-job
communications, hence allowing for the construction of coordination mechanisms.
Grid Resource Allocation Manager (GRAM) - allows for task remote execution
and state management through gatekeepers, the afferent API providing submission, moni-
toring and cancellation/termination primitives. The context required for the specified task
to be executed can be outlined by a job request file. The syntax of this request file has
to follow the rules of the Resource Specification Language (RSL). The RSL file exposed
below for exemplification purposes, specifies the environment and the location of an MPI
program to be launched on two machines, namely, for the herein example, unitA.unit.edu
and unitB.unit.edu:
+
( &(resourceManagerContact=”unitA . un i t . edu ”)
( count=1)
( jobtype=mpi )
( l a b e l=”subjob 0”)
( environment=(GLOBUS DUROC SUBJOB INDEX 0) )
( d i r e c t o r y=/home/ r epo s i t o r y /mpis )
( executab le=/home/ r e po s i t o r y /mpis/example )
)
( &(resourceManagerContact=”unitB . un i t . edu ”)
( count=1)
( jobtype=mpi )
( l a b e l=”subjob 1”)
( environment=(GLOBUS DUROC SUBJOB INDEX 1) )
( d i r e c t o r y=/home/ r epo s i t o r y /mpis )
( executab le=/home/ r e po s i t o r y /mpis/example )
)
GRAM is responsible for interpreting and processing the RSL file as well as for taking
the appropriate actions. Remote execution is completed by the gatekeeper which is respon-
sible for creating a secure communication channel between the interacting machines and for
actually creating the job manager which, in turn, handles by delegation the execution of
the job. Job requests are dispatched by the job manager to local resource managers which
further manage callbacks and client cancellation requests. The local resource manager is
also responsible for securely sending the output results back to the client through Global
Access to Secondary Storage (GASS). The stages of the remote execution are modeled as
an automaton, the job manager being responsible for signaling back the state changes.
The GRAM scheduler automaton illustrated in Figure 2 corresponds to the remote execu-
tion phases. A few special states may be outlined - the unsubmitted state was introduced
in order to model the case of a job manager restart before a job submission while done and
failed represent final states. The pending state includes submitted jobs awaiting for the
allocation of the required resources, leading to active jobs in case of success or ending in the
failed state otherwise. The stagein and stageout states may become active only for jobs
requires staging steps, i.e. which require staging the executable or input/output data. In
INRIA
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Figure 2: GRAM Scheduling Model - broker submitted jobs start as pending jobs undergoing
state changes; jobs may end in only one of the final states, Done or Failed.
addition, a job may be temporarily placed by the scheduler in the suspended state. The
failed state may also be reached as the result of a user or system job cancellation.
GridFTP - represents an extension of the FTP protocol on top of IETF RFCs designed
to meet security requirements for the reliable transfer of data across wide-area networks.
Furthermore, the implementation is optimized for high-bandwidth communication making
use of multi-channel parallel transfers over GSI secured, authenticated data channels. The
design of the GridFTP component sustains operations on large datasets, replicas manage-
ment, indexing services, etc.
Global Access to Secondary Storage (GASS) - a service offering support for re-
mote data access and transfer specifically adapted for wide area distributed environments
and applications. The GASS service provides different grid optimized input/output patterns
including caching support, staging, output simulation, real-time monitoring, data filtering,
etc. The GASS also supports remote file access by offering cache-aware remote file manipu-
lation primitives. In addition, GASS, under GSI secure environment, is used by the GRAM
module for client-server output transfer mechanisms. For more details, refer to [5].
3 Installing and Configuring the Globus Toolkit
Several prerequisite software packages are required for installing the Globus Toolkit, e.g.
gcc, zlib, Apache Ant, Tomcat, PostgreSQL, etc. As being out of scope, only the relevant
phases are presented in the following sections. All the additional afferent details may be
found on the Globus dedicated site (http://www.globus.org). For the specific case considered
here, the post-installation process reduces to setting up the environment and security, i.e.
obtaining certificates, creating container certificates and keys, configuring GridFTP, GRAM,
RT n° 0123456789
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WebServices, etc. One has to notice that the herein presented steps stand only as general
guidelines, while not representing by no means a substitute for the official Globus installation
documentation. In addition the different presented packages may not scale for a different
scenario - depending on each specific case, different versions or design patterns have to be
considered. For addressing the proposed requirements, on a per-case basis, binary or source
packages were chosen - this may also be different depending on the base environment, e.g.
a Linux Fedora Core 4 in this case.
3.1 Creating and configuring the environment
The first phase of the installation process requires creating environment variables pointing
to the installation repositories of the different prerequisite components. In addition, a globus
administration account has to be created as well as a globus user account - the account names
were arbitrarily chosen, e.g. globus and globususer, respectively. Moreover, the PostgreSQL
installation procedure creates a postgres administration account. The environment variables
have to be replicated for each of the involved users, according to their specific role, by
modifying, for bash shell for example, the .bash profile file.
In the followings the performed steps are presented in commented snippets with a focus
on the main phases of the installation/configuration process. Assuming to have already
installed the packages, path variables have to be created indicating, were the case, the
installation tree or the directories containing the executable files and/or libraries:
export JAVA HOME=/usr / java / jdk1 . 5 . 0 04
export ANT HOME=/opt/apache−ant −1.6.5
export CATALINA HOME=/opt/apache−tomcat−5.5.12
export GLOBUS LOCATION=/opt/ g lobus/ globus −4.0.1
export PATH=${PATH} : ${ANTHOME}/ bin
Considering the repartition of roles for the created users, different parts of the installation
tree have to be owned by different users, as required - we assume a binary installation of
the Apache Tomcat package, the /opt/globus/globus-4.0.1 representing at this step an
empty directory:
chown −R globus : g lobus / usr /apache−tomcat−5.5.12
chown globus : g lobus /opt/ g lobus/ globus −4.0.1
Additionally, the PostgreSQL database has to be initialized under the postgres user - the
output is also attached bellow:
su − pos tg r e s
i n i tdb −D /var / l i b / pgsq l /data/
The f i l e s be long ing to t h i s database system w i l l be owned by use r ” pos tg r e s ” .
This use r must a l s o own the se rv e r p roc e s s .
The database c l u s t e r w i l l be i n i t i a l i z e d with l o c a l e en US . i so885915 .
This l o c a l e s e t t i n g w i l l prevent the use o f indexes [ . . . ] .
F ix ing pe rm i s s i on s on ex i s t i n g d i r e c t o ry /var / l i b / pgsq l /data / . . . ok
c r e a t i ng d i r e c t o r y /var / l i b / pgsq l / data // base . . . ok
c r e a t i ng d i r e c t o r y /var / l i b / pgsq l / data // g l oba l . . . ok
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c r e a t i ng d i r e c t o r y /var / l i b / pgsq l / data // pg x log . . . ok
c r e a t i ng d i r e c t o r y /var / l i b / pgsq l / data // pg c l og . . . ok
c r e a t i ng template1 database in /var / l i b / pgsq l /data // base / 1 . . . ok
c r e a t i ng c on f i g u r a t i o n f i l e s . . . ok
i n i t i a l i z i n g pg shadow . . . ok
enab l ing un l imi ted row s i z e f o r system t ab l e s . . . ok
i n i t i a l i z i n g pg depend . . . ok
c r e a t i ng system views . . . ok
load ing p g d e s c r i p t i o n . . . ok
c r e a t i ng conve r s i on s . . . ok
s e t t i n g p r i v i l e g e s on bu i l t−in ob j e c t s . . . ok
vacuuming database template1 . . . ok
copying template1 to template0 . . . ok
Success . You can now s t a r t the database s e rv e r us ing :
/ usr /bin/ postmaster −D /var / l i b / pgsq l /data/
or
/ usr /bin/ pg c t l −D /var / l i b / pgsq l /data / − l l o g f i l e s t a r t
After initializing the database, the PostgreSQL daemon has to be started:
/ usr /bin/ p g c t l −D /var / l i b / pgsq l / data/ − l l o g f i l e s t a r t
At this step it should be possible to compile and install the Globus Toolkit - the instal-
lation has to be performed as the globus user. Different flavors may be chosen at compile
time, depending on the already installed software packages - for example, if a vendor MPI
resides on the machine, an MPI flavor of Globus can be built, if desired. For the herein case
no special flavor is specified, the gcc64dbg and gcc64dbgpthr being built by default:
su − g lobus
ta r −xvz f gt4 .0.1− a l l−source− i n s t a l l e r . t a r . gz
cd gt4 .0.1− a l l−source− i n s t a l l e r
. / c on f i gu r e −−p r e f i x=$GLOBUS LOCATION
make 2>&1 | t e e bu i ld . l og
make i n s t a l l
3.2 Setting up security
The security context is ensured by creating and employing certificates, the globus user being
responsible for all the afferent administrative tasks - managing SimpleCA, starting and stop-
ping the container, deploying services, etc. In order to accomplish all these tasks, read and
write permission have to be granted for the globus user under the $GLOBUS LOCATION
directory. As a first step, generating a certificate requires to define a distinguished name -
as an example, we may have the following structure:
O=parad i seo
+−−−−−−−−−+−−−−−−−−−−+
| |
OU=ParadisEO
+−−−−−−−+−−−−−−−+
| |
OU=ca . g lobus . parad i seo
+−−−−−+−−−−−+
| |
cn=ParadisEO CA
RT n° 0123456789
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Having chosen a distinguished name, globus specific scripts are employed for generating
and signing certificates:
$GLOBUS LOCATION/ setup / g lobus/ setup−simple−ca
C e r t i f i c a t e A u t h o r i t y S e t u p
This s c r i p t w i l l setup a C e r t i f i c a t e Authority f o r s i gn ing Globus
u se r s c e r t i f i c a t e s . I t w i l l a l s o generate a s imple CA package that
can be d i s t r i b u t e d to the u se r s o f the CA.
The CA in format ion about the c e r t i f i c a t e s i t d i s t r i b u t e s w i l l be
kept in : . . .
The unique sub j e c t name f o r t h i s CA i s :
cn=ParadisEO CA, ou=ca . g lobus . parad i seo , ou=ParadisEO , o=parad i seo
Do you want to keep t h i s as the CA sub j e c t (y/n) [ y ] : n
Enter a unique sub j e c t name f o r t h i s CA:
cn=Globus Simple CA, ou=ca . g lobus . parad i seo , ou=ParadisEO , o=parad i seo
Enter the emai l o f the CA ( th i s i s the emai l where c e r t i f i c a t e r eque s t s
w i l l be sent to be s igned by the CA) : <a va l i d ema i l ad r e s s>
. . .
Enter PEM pass phrase :
Ve r i f y i ng − Enter PEM pass phrase :
c r e a t i ng CA con f i g package . . . done .
. . .
***********************************************************************
setup−s s l−u t i l s : Complete
Furthermore, as root user, the GSI has to be set up, creating a grid-security file and a
trusted certificates directory - a Globus CA certificate is also generated at this step:
$GLOBUS LOCATION/ setup / g lobus s imple ca CA Hash se tup /setup−g s i −d e f au l t
setup−g s i : Conf igur ing GSI s e cu r i t y
Making / e t c / grid−s e c u r i t y . . .
mkdir / e t c / grid−s e cu r i t y
Making t ru s t ed c e r t s d i r e c t o ry : / e t c / grid−s e c u r i t y / c e r t i f i c a t e s /
mkdir / e t c / grid−s e cu r i t y / c e r t i f i c a t e s /
I n s t a l l i n g / e t c / grid−s e c u r i t y / c e r t i f i c a t e s // grid−s e c u r i t y . con f . f a 0 f 4 1 8 f . . .
Running grid−s e cu r i t y−c on f i g . . .
I n s t a l l i n g Globus CA c e r t i f i c a t e i n to t ru s t ed CA c e r t i f i c a t e d i r e c t o r y . . .
I n s t a l l i n g Globus CA s i gn ing p o l i c y i n to t ru s t ed CA c e r t i f i c a t e d i r e c t o r y . . .
setup−g s i : Complete
The second phase in securing the environment consists in creating certificates for the
different roles which act inside Globus - host certificates, users, proxy, container certificates,
etc. Each of the generated certificates has to be signed and sent back through a reliable
secure medium to its respective owner.
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3.2.1 Generating and signing host certificates
In order to exemplify the protocol required for setting up certificates, the sequence of com-
mands performed for generating, signing and installing a host certificate is exposed bellow.
 obtaining the host certificate - as root, the following scripts are launched:
source $GLOBUS LOCATION/ e t c / globus−user−env . sh
grid−ce r t−r e que s t −host ‘ hostname ‘
A pr i va t e host key and a c e r t i f i c a t e r eque s t has been generated
with the sub j e c t : . . .
P lease e−mail the r eque s t to the Globus Simple CA <ca@grid5000 . f r >
You may use a command s im i l a r to the f o l l ow i ng :
cat / e t c / grid−s e c u r i t y / ho s t c e r t r e que s t . pem | mail <ca@grid5000 . f r>
Only use the above i f t h i s machine can send AND r e c e i v e e−mail . i f
not , p l e a s e mai l us ing some other method .
Your c e r t i f i c a t e w i l l be mai led to you with in two working days . I f
you r e c e i v e no response , contac t Globus Simple CA at <ca@grid5000 . f r>
 sign and install the host certificate - entitle the host as a recognized entity inside
the grid. For this particular case, installing the certificate consists in only copying
the file under the /etc/grid-security directory. In the followings, the existence of a
certificate repository is assumed, here named certrepository, accessible by the globus
user:
cp / e t c / grid−s e c u r i t y / h o s t c e r t r e qu e s t . pem \
/ c e r t r ep o s i t o r y / ‘ hostname ‘ c e r t r e q u e s t . pem
sudo −u globus grid−ca−s i gn −in / c e r t r e po s i t o r y / ‘ hostname ‘ c e r t r e q u e s t . pem \
−out / c e r t r e p o s i t o r y / ‘ hostname ‘ s i gn ed .pem −pas s i n pass : CAmanager \
−d i r ˜ g lobus / . g lobus/simpleCA/
cp / c e r t r e p o s i t o r y / ‘ hostname ‘ s i gn ed . pem / e t c / grid−s e cu r i t y / hos t c e r t . pem
While not exemplified, generating certificates for the users, proxies, etc. is similar in
nature to a given extent with generating host certificates - please refer to the Globus docu-
mentation for further details.
3.2.2 Adding authorization statements
In order to authorize the globususer account for different later actions, performed on top of
Globus, a grid-mapfile has to be created by the root user under the /etc/grid-security
directory. In a second step, the appropriate lines have to be added to the file:
$GLOBUS LOCATION/ sb in / grid−mapf i le−add−entry −dn
”/O=parad i seo /OU=ParadisEO/OU=ca . g lobus . parad i seo /
OU=machine . gr id5000 . f r /CN=ParadisEO CA” −ln g l obu su se r
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3.3 Configuring the Globus components
Assuming no errors occurred during environment creation and configuration, the different
Globus components have to be configured, as required. For the herein example, we will
concentrate on GridFTP and GRAM only - refer to the Globus documentation for further
details.
For configuring GridFTP, considering basic requirements, as an example, an /etc/x-
inetd.d/gridftp file has to be created with the following content:
s e r v i c e g s i f t p
{
i n s t anc e s = 100
socke t type = stream
wait = no
use r = root
env += GLOBUS LOCATION=/opt/ g lobus/ globus −4.0.1
env += LD LIBRARY PATH=/opt/ g lobus/ globus −4.0.1/ l i b 2
se rv e r = /opt/ g lobus/ globus −4.0.1/ sb in / globus−g r i d f tp−s e rv e r
s e r v e r a r g s = − i
l o g on s uc c e s s += DURATION
n i c e = 10
d i s ab l e = no
}
Furthermore, gatekeepers can be set up by creating an /etc/xinetd.d/gsigatekeeper
file on each server machine, as follows:
s e r v i c e g s i ga t eke epe r
{
so cke t type = stream
pro toco l = tcp
wait = no
use r = root
env = LD LIBRARY PATH=/opt/ g lobus/ globus −4.0.1/ l i b
s e rv e r = /opt/ g lobus/ globus −4.0.1/ sb in / globus−gatekeeper
s e r v e r a r g s = −con f /opt/ g lobus / . . . / e t c / globus−gatekeeper . con f
d i s ab l e = no
}
In addition, the following two lines have to be added in the /etc/services file:
gs i ga t eke epe r 2119/ tcp # Globus gatekeeper
g s i f t p 2811/ tcp # Globus / GridFTP
The globus user may be empowered to run GRAM related commands without explicit
authentication by adding the following corresponding lines in the sudoers file, hence enabling
the globus user to submit jobs inside the Globus virtual grid:
g lobus ALL=(username1 , username2 ) NOPASSWD:
/opt/ g lobus/ globus −4.0.1/ l i b ex e c / globus−gridmap−and−execute −g
/ e t c / grid−s e c u r i t y / grid−mapf i l e
/opt/ g lobus/ globus −4.0.1/ l i b ex e c / globus−job−manager−s c r i p t . p l *
g lobus ALL=(username1 , username2 ) NOPASSWD:
/opt/ g lobus/ globus −4.0.1/ l i b ex e c / globus−gridmap−and−execute −g
/ e t c / grid−s e c u r i t y / grid−mapf i l e
/opt/ g lobus/ globus −4.0.1/ l i b ex e c / globus−gram−l o c a l−proxy−t o o l *
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As only a few details were offered, focusing on different parts of the installation and the
configuration process, for further information refer to the Globus documentation.
4 A case study - Grid5000
4.1 GRID5000 - Environment and Functional Aspects
GRID5000 is a French nation-wide experimental grid, connecting several sites which host
clusters of PCs interconnected by RENATER4 (the French academic network). GRID5000
is promoted by CNRS, INRIA and several universities5 [1]. At this time the grid is gathering
more than 3000 processors with more than 2.5 Tb of cumulated memory and 100 Tb of non-
volatile storage capacity. Inter-connections sustain communications of 10 Gbps, in addition,
the clusters including high speed networks (Myrinet, Infiniband, etc.). The target point
to be achieved is a marker-stone of 5000 processors for late 2007, regrouping nine centers:
Bordeaux, Grenoble, Lille, Lyon, Nancy, Orsay, Rennes, Sophia-Antipolis and Toulouse.
The architecture and the infrastructure of GRID5000 are designed having as main cri-
terion deep reconfigurability capabilities. The design envisages running different operating
systems, i.e. Linux, Solaris, Windows, different OS layers, etc., as well as the use of differ-
ent grid middlewares - Globus, Unicore, P2P middleware, etc. In addition a large range of
research requirements, relating to different research domains, have to be satisfied. In order
to accomplish all the specifications, a deep-reconfiguration mechanism is provided, allowing
for system software images to be deployed and installed, (re)configured and retrieved for
later experiments. The entire protocol requires (1) a reservation phase in order to obtain
an ensemble of machines distributed across the grid, (2) the deployment of one of the avail-
able software images on a pre-specified target partition, (3) the machines are rebooted with
the new environment and (4) the experimentations are carried out for the duration of the
reservation.
As an optional phase, the entire environment can be retrieved as an archive and stored
for later experiments. We should note that the user has complete control over the deployed
image - no restrictions are imposed.
Each of the GRID5000 sites offers a default environment meeting most of the common ex-
perimentation requirements. The users also have the possibility of storing and installing dif-
ferent packages in the afferent home account which is replicated through LDAP+NFS across
the machines. The management of the user home accounts and user policies is sketched in
Figure 4.1.
The user accounts are created on all sites, as mentioned, a per-site LDAP+NFS server
being responsible for account data replication services inside clusters. All sites contain the
same tree, local administrators having management rights on per-site branches. No inter-
cluster home account synchronization is provided by default - the user is responsible for
4Re´seau National de Te´le´communications pour la Technologie, l’Enseignement et la Recherche -
http://www.renater.fr
5CNRS - http://www.cnrs.fr/index.html; INRIA - http://www.inria.fr.
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Figure 3: GRID5000 User Management
installing and customizing the account on the different sites. In case the default environ-
ment + the home account local environment proves to be sufficient for the requirements
of a specific user, the experimentation protocol reduces to a reservation phase, at a clus-
ter or grid level, specifying the duration, number of machines, sites, etc. followed by the
experimentation itself.
Due to security considerations the GRID5000 sites are not directly connected to the In-
ternet, providing an isolated domain, exterior access being possible through proxies. While
restrictive to some extent, this security constraint allowed for inside enhancements - no
limitations is imposed between the GRID5000 sites, thus a large scale confined cluster of
clusters being built. Accessing the GRID5000 machines requires to pass strong authenti-
cation procedures which employ GRID5000 X.509 digital certificates and state-of-the-art
security mechanisms. Furthermore, access is possible only through a set of designated front-
end machines. A schematic overview of the GRID5000 security layer is offered in Figure
4.1.
The interconnection between sites is constructed on top of RENATER technology, using
a combination of DiffServ and MPLS. For security, network layer VPNs may use tunneling
or network layer encryption (layer 3 VPN), while at link layer VPNs like MPLS, VPNs are
directly provided by network service providers (layer 2-3 VPN). The advantage of the MPLS
VPN over IP VPN (Ipsec) is performance. As the GRID5000 sites are connected to the
same NREN, the multi-domain issue of the MPLS technology is avoided here. This MPLS
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Figure 4: GRID5000 Security Architecture
based Grid architecture allows creating a trust context that even enables to experiment new
security solutions for IP VPNbased Grids.
4.2 Deploying Globus on GRID5000
Node reconfiguration operations on GRID5000 are performed through a deployment tool
called Kadeploy2 6 which allows the users to deploy customized environments on a pre-
specified disk partition of a set of selected nodes. After the deployment phase, the user has
complete access to all the levels of the operating system up to the kernel core components
- no restrictions are imposed. A trace over the status of the reservations is maintained
with the support of several specialized operating components enforced by database support.
Different deployment aspects are specified and stored in the database, either as dynamic
or static information, describing the coordinates of the environment to be created (disk
partition schemes, deployed environment), user rights over the reserved nodes, environment
description (kernel, initrd, custom kernel parameters, desired filesystem for the environment,
post-installation scripts location) and logs of the deployment operations.
Assuming a reservation has been already performed, a simple deployment protocol re-
quires the following steps:
 the user has to initiate a deployment operation by providing an environment name, a
deployment partition and the name of the machines to perform the deployment upon;
6Complete details on the Kadeploy2 deployment system may be found at the following address:
https://www.grid5000.fr/mediawiki/index.php/Grid5000:Software#Kadeploy 2.
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 for the specified environment name, if valid, the associated information is retrieved
from the database - pre-specified and registered by the builder of the software image;
 at this step, the physical deployment can be initiated. The reserved nodes are rebooted
on a minimal system through a networking booting sequence. The target disk partition
is prepared for the deployment, i.e. partitioning, formatting and mounting operations
are carried out, etc.;
 having the nodes set up, a broadcast is performed, transmitting in a pipe-line fashion
the designated environment to all the specified nodes;
 after completing the broadcast phase, the post-install scripts stage-in, modifying the
environment parameters in order to comply with node and site policies (mounting
tables, authentication keys, etc.);
 the last phase consists in rebooting the installed environment under the new configu-
ration, a network bootloader being employed along the process.
Having an environment deployed on one of the nodes allows for further reconfiguration.
At the end of the reconfiguration phase, the environment can be saved back as an archive
and registered in the database for later (re)deployment. The above presented steps outline
the procedure undertaken for constructing the Globus image, on top of a basic back-bone
environment, deployed and later reconfigured. A Globus installation has been performed
inside the basic deployed environment, the final image containing all the required scripts7
and components for the image to act as a master or a slave inside a virtual Globus grid. In
this scenario, the front-end node runs Globus Toolkit services (GRAM, GSIFTP, gatekeeper,
certificates, etc.) while a batch-scheduler is executed on each of the slave computing nodes
- an overview is offered in Figure 4.2.
The deployment procedure of the Globus Toolkit image follows the above exposed steps,
the configuration scripts included in the archive offering the possibility to construct a virtual
Globus grid in an automatic manner, requiring only to specify the list of machines to be used.
At the end of the reservation, Kadeploy is also the component responsible for rebooting the
machines back under the default system image.
An example of typical deployment time(s) on five clusters of Grid5000 is illustrated in
Table 1 - note that this may vary depending on the size of the deployed image, for example
if customized, etc. In addition the deployment time may be influenced by local factors,
depending on the logical/physical configuration of the cluster, which may result in protocol
deployment failures, etc. In order to perform the grid deployment, on all the five clusters,
namely Azur, Parasol, Paravent, Sagittaire and Orsay, the deployment procedure has been
started simultaneously on all the five sites. An overall number of CPUs ranging from 20
to 300 CPUs has been considered - no significant variance or difference has been noticed
between the considered sites under the specified conditions. For each of the tests a bellow
10 minutes deployment time has been obtained.
7All the required details and resources may be found at the following address:
https://gridlille.futurs.inria.fr/dokuwiki/doku.php?id=start
INRIA
Building a Virtual Globus Grid in a Reconfigurable Environment 19
Figure 5: Globus Virtual Grid on Grid5000
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Table 1: Deployment times on five Grid5000 clusters. The upper line of the table (in
bold face) represents the number of processors per site while the lower line (in bold face)
represents the total number of CPUs for the overall deployment.
In addition, in Table 2, broadcasting time(s) for an MPICH-G2/Globus based application
are exposed - the tests were performed on the Orsay Grid5000 cluster. While being strongly
dependent on the communication infrastructure built internally by the MPICH-G2 routines
(on top of Globus) the included information may offer a few performance measures of the
environment. The obtained broadcast time(s) may also stand as a comparison basis for
different further communication patterns, etc.
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Table 2: Broadcasting times for an MPICH-G2 based program. The first column of the
table (in bold face) represents the number of CPUs/processes (one process per CPU). The
upper line (in bold face) represents the size of the message, in bytes, to be broadcasted to
all the processes.
For each test run, the overall execution time has been considered - initialization, broad-
cast, termination. As it can be observed from the table, the size of the broadcasted message
is a negligible factor as compared to the number of considered processors, i.e. it does not
influence significantly the overall execution time. This effect is due to the fact that, for
MPICH-G2 based programs, the initialization phase requires interconnecting each process
with all the other processes. Network interferences may also be responsible for the slight
variation in execution time.
5 Conclusions
While being a complex infrastructure, a virtual grid has the advantage of being easily ex-
tendible over the boundaries of the physical in-place grid. In addition, considering the
reconfigurable nature of Grid5000, the possibility of having a completely user-reconfigurable
Globus environment opens the pathway for a broad range of experimental setups. As the
main difficulty in constructing a Globus virtual grid consists in constructing and configuring
the environment, having a ready to use Globus deployable image, eliminates most of the
techincal aspects, hence offering the possibility to set a focus on the experimental part.
The built Globus image represents a testbed for further improvements and development,
having also the main advantage of being user-(re)configurable. This is particularly important
when considering the imminent future interconnection of Grid5000 with external grid/dis-
tributed computing projects like the Dutch DAS-38 (Distributed ASCII Supercomputer, third
generation) or NAREGI9 (National Research Grid Initiative - University Science Malaysia).
8http://www.cs.vu.nl/das3/overview.shtml
9http://www.naregi.org/concept/index e.html
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